DURING WORLD WAR n CANADIANS hosted, for the most part unknowingly, tens of thousands of people whom the federal government interned. So skilfully secretive were the police and the army that even politically-aware persons like myself were ignorant of the large scale of what was happening. Only the removal of Japanese Canadians from British Columbia coastal areas was generally known. Mainly farmers and fishermen, these people were victims of the combined effects of an endemic anti-Asian racism and a craven Ottawa government determined to do as Uncle Sam had done with Japanese Americans.
insist upon having, and exercising, their civil rights. This struggle has always signally concerned the power to punish -by death, by torture, by imprisonment, by fine, by confiscation of property, by exiling. All these forms of punishment have been used in England, the source of Canadian criminal law, and all have been strenuously opposed. But the basic issue has not been the type of punishment so much as the route to be followed to the point at which punishment is inflicted. Broadly, there are only two routes: one is arbitrary and the other is by due process of law. The conflict between proponents of these opposite policies is very ancient and continues to this day.
Those like myself who favour due process against the arbitrary course are heartened to realize that we have on our side a long and noble tradition, one which is adorned by such great landmarks of legal and popular history as the In Canada the same theme is expressed in our 1960 Bill of Rights, which affirms that "men and institutions remain free only when freedom is founded on... the rule of law" and which explicitly recognizes and declares "certain human rights and fundamental freedoms," including "the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law." Any person's right to "equality before the l0 See Helen M. Cam, Magna Carta: Event or Document? (London 1965). "For example, the USSR and PRC constitutions both enshrine the following rights: inviolability of home and person (but arrests may be made with sanction of the prosecutor or court -i.e. "due process"); freedom of correspondence, speech, assembly, association and demonstration. In China the freedom to strike is preserved but not in the USSR (Articles 50, 54, 55, 56, of USSR Constitution and 45,47 of PRC Constitution). law and the protection of the law" is also recognized and declared in the Canadian Bill of Rights.
What is more, no federal law can be construed by a court so as to infringe upon any rights which the statute proclaims.
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All these rights, it is said in the Bill, "have existed and shall continue to exist." It comes as something of a shock to read this, for those rights certainly did not exist for anyone interned during the war. Nor were those internees able to exercise the ancient right of anyone to habeas corpus, which is the right to test before the judges of a high court the lawfulness of one's imprisonment.
To see how this situation came about involves tracing the origin of the law under which internment was permitted. We first go to the War Measures Act, which was originally enacted during a brief session of Parliament held in August 1914, after Britain had gone to war on the fourth day of that month. The Act became law on 22 August 1914. It remains on the statute books virtually unchanged (except for one highly important subsection) and was used alike in World War I, World War n, and the so-called "Québec Crisis" of 1970.
The main provisions of the War Measures Act are as follows:
(1) In general -if war, invasion or insurrection occurs or is apprehended, the Government of Canada may do and authorize such acts and things and make such orders and regulations as are deemed "necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada." (2) More specifically, the federal government is authorized to control: all publications, including censorship of same; all means of communication; all arrests, detentions and deportations of persons; all ports, harbours and territorial waters and ships therein; all transportation by land, air and water; all trading, including exports and imports; all production and manufacturing; and, all disposition of property and it use. (3) To get around the Bill of Rights, a subsection was added: "6(5) Any act or thing done or authorized or any order or regulation made under the authority of this Act, shall be deemed not to be an abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any right or freedom recognized by the Canadian Bill of Rights." (4) The Act also provides that a formal proclamation by the government that war, invasion, or insurrection (real or apprehended) exists is all that is necessary to establish the existence of the situation described in the proclamation and, thereby, the lawfulness of all actions of the government, including violations of the Bill of Rights.
Thus, when the Trudeau cabinet decided in October 1970 that there was a state of apprehended insurrection in Québec, no authority in the land could lawfully prevent the steps taken by that government to put the War Measures Act into effect and to arrest and intem people pursuant to regulations made under the Act. In particular, it was not possible to go before a court of law and prove, or try to prove, that in fact there was no insurrection, either real or apprehended, and thereby to show that l2 This is not the place to review various court decisions which have rendered this potentially important piece of legislation a nullity, but (in fact, this has) occurred. the basis for invoking the War Measures Act did not exist -except, perhaps, in Prime Minister Trudeau's head.
The Defence of Canada Regulations
ALL REGULATIONS made under the sweeping powers given to the government under the War Measures Act have the force of law and the government may (among many other powers) prescribe penalties for breaches. No provision is made which would permit anyone arrested or detained under the authority of the War Measures Act or the Regulations to resort to the courts if the Regulation itself forbade that being done. But the Act, while closing the door on such relief, is kinder when it comes to some owners of some property. Section 7 provides that whenever any property has been appropriated by the government under the War Measures Act and compensation has not been agreed to, the Minister of Justice must refer the owner's claim to be adjudicated by a court. There is no such provision to protect either the "ordinary" internee or the owner of property which the government has confiscated and handed over to the Custodian of Enemy Property. In all such cases there is no compensation.
I emphasize that there is also no protection for people who may fall afoul of the Act or the Regulations. Such persons have no way to challenge the legality of their imprisonment; still less do they have any legal right to be compensated for being jailed. The difference between the government's perception of people and the property of some, but not all, is remarkable indeed.
By virtue of the War Measures Act the Defence of Canada Regulations were promulgated on 3 September 1939 by Order-in-Council P.C. 2483. The internment section is numbered 21.1 lived with it for more than two years. It provides:
The Minister of Justice, if satisfied, that with a view to preventing any particular person, from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the safety of the State, it is necessary so to do, may, notwithstanding anything in these Regulations, make an order... directing that he be detained in such place, and under such conditions, as the Minister of Justice may from time to time determine; and any person shall, while detained by virtue of an order made under this paragraph, be deemed to be in legal custody.
[Emphasis added]
The provision which makes an internee "deemed to be in legal custody" is important. It is precisely this which deprives the person of any resort to the courts, even to the ancient right to habeas corpus. During World War II a number of internees attempted, but all failed, to procure their release through the courts. The answer always given was that, because of the words under discussion, the courts had no jurisdiction to override the executive authority.
One such case is that of J.A. "Pat" SuJJivan, president of the Canadian Seamen's Union, who was interned for union activity in 1940. He attempted to procure a writ of habeas corpus from the Ontario High Court, but Mr. Justice Hope refused. Sullivan then appealed to the highest court in Ontario and was represented there by two of Canada's most eminent lawyers: J.R. Cartwnght, K.C., who later became Chief Justice of Canada, and J.L. Cohen, K.C., who later joined the Wartime Labour Relations Board.
The three Ontario judges were unanimous in rejecting the appeal without even hearing a submission by counsel for the Crown. Their reasoning comes in four parts:
(1) While the justice minister must be "satisfied" of the necessity to detain the person in question, he need not make any personal investigation. He is free to become "satisfied" because of a recommendation of some other person who had been instructed to look into the case. (That other person normally would be an RCMP officer. This finding means that the police, not the minister, possessed the effective power to intern.) (2) The recommendation did not have to be brought before the Court if the authorities felt its disclosure would not be in the interests of the state. (This meant that no matter how wrong the reasons for the internment might be, there was no way of forcing their disclosure to the Court and therefore no way of offering, or even trying to offer, an answer or defence.) (3) A person detained under Regulation 21 is a "prisoner of war, Class 2," and is therefore beyond the power of a law court to rescue. (This meant that only the justice minister-who would normally act on RCMP advice -could release an internee.) (4) If a prisoner had appealed his internment to the tribunal provided for that purpose, as Sullivan, among others, had done, even an extreme irregularity in the proceedings before that tribunal would not affect the legality of the internment. (This meant that proceedings before the tribunals were of no real consequence.)
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It must be stressed that internment was by no means the only way in which the government could deal with persons suspected of being dangerous to the state in wartime. There were plenty of clauses in the Defence of Canada Regulations (to say nothing of the Criminal Code) which created a host of offenses. People could be charged and tried in the normal way (for example, by due process of law) in respect of all such offenses which were thought to have occurred. Sullivan and many others could have been dealt with in this way and, had this course been followed, their civil rights would have been protected instead of being trampled upon. The fact that they were interned suggests that the government indeed felt it might not be able to prove a case against them and therefore decided to get rid of them by the uncomplicated process of internment, which completely short-circuits due process of law. External Affairs conference room on 10 July. It was attended by seven officials, including Norman Robertson, who was then the prime minister's principal adviser on foreign affairs. Also present were J.F. MacNeill, K.C., a high officer in the justice department; W.PJ. O'Meara of the Department of State; Superintendent E.W. Bavin and Inspector Rivett-Camac, both RCMP experts in anticommunism.
Background to the Invocation of the War Measures Act
According to Robertson, this meeting was convened in order to discuss the possible use in certain cases of the right possessed by the government, under the Naturalization Act, to revoke a persons' naturalization for disaffection or disloyalty. Interestingly, O'Meara remarked that "naturalization applications by Nazis and Fascists are now checked as carefully as those by Communists," but did not think a public statement to that effect would be desirable.
The meeting came to no agreement as to whether any revocation procedures should be implemented, but one of the officials from the external affairs department agreed to cooperate with the RCMP in preparing a statement on the most flagrant cases. What use would be made of the statement was not indicated.
The same meeting heard a description of the Fascist oath of loyalty to II Duce (Benito Mussolini) which bound the oath-taker "to execute without discussion the orders of II Duce and to serve with all my strength, and if necessary with my blood, the cause of the Fascist revolution." There was a comparable oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler taken by Nazi Party members and by those in its youth group. Other Germans could be influenced by the doctrine of "racial comradeship," as propounded by Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy: briefly, there was held to exist "a great German national community" which reached out past the borders of the Reich and included "the German racial comrades abroad." As Hermann Goering explained in 1936 "... the racial comrades in the homeland, the nearly one million German citizens living abroad, and the many millions of persons of German blood living in Europe and overseas, must not be lost to German culture."
The conclusion the Ottawa authorities drew from these revelations was that the so-called "racial comrades" in Canada would owe a fealty to Germany which was above and beyond any loyalty to Canada, despite the absence of a formal oath. I met a few of these "racial comrades" in Vancouver in 1938 and 1939. To me they seemed to be fanatics.
Once Mackenzie King had signed the Regulations into law, the key question was: what categories of people would be interned? On this issue there was a sharp but secret struggle between the RCMP on the one hand and the External Affairs Department, supported by some officials of the Justice Department, on the other.
The police regarded the Communists as the main enemy and wanted to treat them accordingly. Nazis and Fascists were seen as nuisances more than as serious enemies. Why this was the case on the eve of a war against Nazism (in September 1939) and Fascism (in June 1940), as represented by Germany and Italy, cannot be rationally explained unless the higher officers of the RCMP thought so much like Nazis and Fascists themselves as to be almost indistinguishable from them. Ernest La pointe almost certainly saw eye-to-eye with the police. 
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The full text of this letter is found in Appendix Two.
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These were principally organizations of Ukrainian and Finnish workers who were considered to be under Communist influence. I told MacNeill that I was appalled by the programme contemplated, and that it involved a great deal of bitter interracial resentment and the prospect of endless troubles throughout industrial and mining areas, as well as the alienation of the sympathy and support of great blocs of opinion which, if properly handled, could be led to support any efforts the government was making rather than to oppose them. I thought the Police should concentrate on their plans for the immediate arrest of persons suspected of treasonable activity, and that they would be ill advised to destroy organizations about which they now know a great deal and with whose personnel they are familiar. It would drive them underground, which would greatly increase the Police problems in this country in wartime. I thought, further, that as regards the whole question of the status of the Communists, we should not take any precipitate action, but should wait and see how they adapt themselves to new international alignments; that the wind had been taken out of their sails by the events of recent days, and they had been badly compromised by developments in the foreign policy of the USSR, and that I would be surprised if the Police found them abetting Nazi or Fascist activities in this country or very actively prosecuting their own propagandiste activities. It "that you should be the guiding light in that respect, since you are closer to the icts than we are." He thus seemed, by agreeing with Bavin and Wood, to be i treating from the position which he had taken in his earlier discussions with Robertson.
As discussion proceeded during the next three days, it focused increasingly on Germans and Italians, not Communists, although at one point Leopold commented that the "Communist Party is even now preparing to go underground" -information which surprised Robertson, who thought that they were "operating wide open and suspected nothing."
The first decision made was to take action to seek cooperation with US authorities to prevent wanted persons from escaping to that country.
Next, it was decided that some 500 Germans in Canada would be taken into custody as soon as war was declared. These were members either of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (the Nazi Party) or of its youth section, the so-called German Workers' Front. In the course of making this decision Robertson pointed out that "... it comes down to a question of whether they would be dangerous if allowed to remain outside of the concentration camps. [It is interesting to note that Robertson used this term.] A question of whether they take their oath seriously [i.e., the oath of loyalty to Hitler] or merely as a formality...." Bavin thought they took the oath seriously, particularly the 500 German Nazis, including the young Nazis, although the corresponding oath taken by the Italian Fascists might not be taken too seriously by them. The committee opted to have the 500 arrested and interned. MacNeill rounded off the discussion by pointing out that "there could be no public outcry against our apprehending them. Two statements should be prepared, one for each organization, giving the reasons for their being picked up."
The committee then addressed itself to the question of how many more persons of German origin might have to be picked up. Leopold did not know. The committee was obliged to go through an extensive list of Germans, name by name, deciding in each case whether the person should be arrested and interned. The criterion seems to have been whether the person was considered actually or potentially dangerous. For example, the case of Frederick Reichert, as recorded in the minutes, was dealt with thus: S/Sgt. Leopold: Now -Frederick REICHERT. He is a man of some means, he does not work and we have proof that he has a bank balance of $25,000.1 am of the opinion that he is either a very important man or of no importance whatever. He is well thought of by the Americans in Montreal and by those who know him in New York. He sometimes appears to be anti-Nazi and at others speaks well of Hitler. I have wondered why he would settled down in a small provincial town like Quebec; we do know that he has travelled to Ottawa and Montreal on numerous occasions and has made useful contacts in these cities.
Mr. MacNeill: His remaining in Quebec may perhaps be explained by the fact that it is one of Canada's most important harbour cities, is one of the few garrison towns in Canada, and has the only active arsenal. It is also quite a manufacturing city. We will enter his name on the list since he appears to be of independent means, is on good terms with German ' sources, moves in garrison circles, and lives in a city which is of strategic importance. I regard him as very suspicious.
Throughout the discussion, serious though the topic was, one detects a situation akin to one in Gilbert and Sullivan's operetta, "The Mikado":
[Ko-Ko, the Lord High Executioner of Japan, sings] As some day it may happen that a victim must be found I've got a little list, -I've got a little list of society offenders who might well be underground, and who never would be missed -who never would be missed! Chorus: He's got 'em on the list -he's got 'em on the list; And they'll none of 'em be missed -they'll none of 'em be missed.
Bavin and Leopold kept pressing the committee to agree that the two German organizations just mentioned should be "outlawed" -a favourite demand of Wood's. Explaining Wood's idea, Leopold claimed that "one of the principles of the outlawing is that it would give the power to raid and search property and offices;" but MacNeill pointed out that outlawing was not necessary for any such purpose. "All you need is a list of the places you wish to raid and search and the power can be granted." Leopold, however, pressed his point, mentioning that towards the end of World War I "there were a number of organizations outlawed, and it had a tremendous effect upon their membership. It was a number of years before they could get well organized again under a different name." (No doubt he had left-wing organizations in mind.) Robertson joined in the discussion by asking what purpose would be served by outlawing any particular organization and Bavin replied that: "if we fail to take that action it will show a weakness on our part in that we fail to come right out and say, 'We don't want you.'" MacNeill thought that arresting all members of the organizations in question would have the effect of clearly indicating "that sentiment." Bavin, however, wasn't satisfied. He pressed the point that Leopold had just made, illustrating the "benefit gained in outlawing organizations during the last war." MacNeill asked what was meant by "outlawing" and Leopold said it meant making the organization illegal by order-in-council: "it would then be illegal to join or belong to it." Robertson asked if there wouldn't be a certain advantage from the police standpoint to leave a skeleton organization there. MacNeill suggested it would be best to wait and see what happened to these organizations on the outbreak of war, and if the feeling was that the organization remained in existence it could be outlawed.
When the consideration of the list of German names was completed, the subject of the Italians recurred. MacNeill pointed out that "we don't want to pick up too many of these persons who are of no real consequence and then have to support their families on relief... and the Italians have big families." Robertson added that he wanted to encourage as much as possible an anti-Fascist feeling among Italians in Canada, and that it would not be a good policy to intern what he called "the sheep" -that they should be allowed to remain where they could express their feelings after the pressure on them had been removed by arresting the leaders of certain Fascist organizations whose members had sworn allegiance to Mussolini. An interesting example of an Italian whose arrest was being considered but rejected involved one A.S. Biffi, whom Robertson described as "a very important business figure... married to a French-Canadian woman (who) has many political contacts." Because of this situation Robertson felt that Biffi would be "more trouble if picked up than if left alone." The same consideration substantially went for Italians named Restaldi and Sebastiani. Robertson added a curious comment about Italians in general. He thought that they "can perform most effectively, in die case of war, when working from the sidelines. That is to say, they seem to be cut out for bomb-throwers, saboteurs, etc." He offered no evidence to support this view.
The committee proceeded with various lists of suspect Italians, and agreed that on the outbreak of war with Italy (which did not occur until 10 June 1940), certain specified persons would be arrested. Toward the end of the meeting, a few other German names were added to the list. In addition to the 500 Nazis originally named, 165 were added for a total of 665 Germans.
The committee's work was summarized in Robertson's letter to Lapointe on 3 September. 18 Lapointe was told that the committee proposed to intern 325 Germans, of whom 265 were citizens of the Reich and 60 were naturalized Canadians of German origin. Why there was so large a difference between the total of 665 reached by the committee, as reported in its minutes and the numbers mentioned in the letter to Lapointe is not explained. The letter required only Lapointe's signature to ensure the internment of the 325, unless they were able to escape or hide. This signature was duly appended to the document.
From these sources, it seems clear that the government's policy was to leave the Communists alone; to tackle the Nazis by interning a few hundred of their known leaders (most of whom were not Canadian nationals) and those who were likely to engage in hostile acts, but not by banning their organizations as such; and, when Italy entered the war, to intern only the most vociferous Fascists.
On the Communist issue, the decision to leave them alone for the moment (in the sense of not banning their party and not interning members) had four reasons: their strength in unions, their popularity in many places, their being already 18 This letter is reproduced as Appendix Four.
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well-infiltrated by police, and their being unlikely to oppose a war against their worst enemies, the Nazis. These reasons were directly at variance with the RCMP view which considered the Communists to be the main danger to Canada and wanted them illegalized at once. The nearest we come to finding a reason for this is Bavin's cryptic reference to "The actions and their attitude as set forth in their Press and at their Meetings." What actions and which attitudes are simply not disclosed. The situation invites speculation. Perhaps Wood, Bavin, Leopold and their ilk were so accustomed to fighting communists that they found the habit difficult to break. Perhaps anticommunism was an article of their particular faith and perceived as axiomatic. Perhaps they merely were expressing the familiar illusion which equates the interests of Canada's people as a whole with the interests of our tiny ruling élite whose unedifying members are so ably described by Peter C. Newman, 19 and whose hides the RCMP are so eager to protect. It is an illusion which has mislead many people, and which helps bar the way to basic social change.
Application of Policy

I NOW EXAMINE how the policy decided upon by Norman Robertson's committee was applied during the first nine months of war (September 1939 to June 1940).
As soon as the Defence of Canada Regulations became law on 3 September, internments began. At this point only German persons known to be Nazis were arrested. Within less than two weeks, two of those interned were released. From then on, the files indicate that even while the internments proceeded, more and more Nazis were being released. For example, on 25 November a letter from Robinson to the justice minister stated that his committee had examined the files on some 22 persons with German names, most of whom were interned in Fort Henry at Kingston. He agreed that all but two of them should be released and his letter was approved by Lapointe. Thus 20 Nazis were freed.
During the winter of 1939-40, the trickle of Germans released grew into a fairly substantial stream. For example, on 1 April 1940, the files contain a list of some 46 persons who were to be released -some on parole, but at least 16 unconditionally.
This strange lenience had two effects. One was to encourage German prisoners at the Kananaskis Camp to write what the Director of Internment Operations, Brigadier-General E. deB. Panet, described as "an impertinent letter." It was sent to Colonel Watson, the Camp Commandant, and threatened that at the end of the war a claim for indemnity for false imprisonment would be made. It also complained that the internees had been treated like common criminals, having been fingerprinted and photographed at the time of interment.
The lenience also had an effect on Brigadier Panet, who found himself increasingly concerned about the situation. As early as 8 February 1940, he wrote to Undersecretary of State E.H. Coleman complaining that "the total number of prisoners of war has dwindled down to 315, and it is possible that more releases will be made after the appeals have been completed...." According to a later letter (11 May 1940) from Panet to the secretary of state, the total number of persons interned in Canada amounted to only 403. To this point, almost one in four of the German Nazis had been released.
But the situation got even more serious, as Panet's next letter (13 May) to the secretary of state discloses. It begins in a formal way: Sir, I have the honour to draw attention to the large number of enemy aliens or other persons interned under the Defence of Canada Regulations, whose release has been ordered, and to the fact that I have now received instructions to release a further eleven intemees, three of whom are single men of military age. Assuming that there were some grounds of suspicion to justify the internment of these persons and to retain them in custody for the past eight months, the advisability of releasing them at this critical time, in direct opposition to the policy now being adopted by all other Allied Nations, would appear to warrant serious consideration.
He then points out that of the 403 persons interned (all Nazis), 142 had been released up to 13 May and eleven more were under immediate consideration. These figures disclose that the percentage of releases was put to 33, that is, more than one-third of the Nazis interned had been freed. Of the eleven additional men whose release was being contemplated, three were the single men of military age, as mentioned by Panet. Their relatives lived in Germany and they had no ties in Canada. Panet thought there was little doubt that "if these men are released, they will endeavour to violate their parole and return to Germany by the United States." He therefore urged that the proposed eleven releases be postponed.
Presumably this plea did not produce the desired results, because three days later Panet wrote an anguished letter on the same subject to the justice minister, virtually demanding an interview to discuss the situation. He noted that his letter of 13 May had been sent on to Lapointe, and he added: I feel so strongly about this situation, that I do not wish to release these prisoners (the eleven) until I have had the opportunity of talking the matter over with you. Furthermore, if these releases are effected, and the public become aware that we are continuing to release Enemy Aliens who have been interned for the past eight months, at this critical time, a very undesirable situation will likely arise.
A postscript to the letter mentions that Panet had just received information that in England the government had issued instructions directing internment of all German and Austrian males between ages 16 and 60 years throughout the United Kingdom.
The issue of the eleven prisoners was still worrying Panet on 28 May, when he wrote another letter to Lapointe stating that he had examined the police files on five of them, and considered the information to be such that their release should be given no consideration. The other six men had signed "a certain impertinent document" and for that reason their release, also, should not be considered.
Some During my recent visit to Petawawa, you informed me that some of the internees had expressed their surprise at some of the releases that had been authorized, intimating that some of those who had been released should have been held in continued detention. I do not remember whether the Camp Spokesman also mentioned this in casual conversation or not.
In discussing the matter with one of the Department of Justice officials, he stated that they were aware that a number of mistakes had been made, and that the matter was being given attention.
He asked me to ascertain whether you could give me any information as to any releases which have been effected which were considered against the interests of the State and the reasons for such belief. Of course, it is understood that any information so given would possibly be hearsay and would merely be of value to assist the authorities and not of any value as evidence in the cases concerned.
Can you secure any information regarding this matter?
In with His Majesty," excluding British subjects. A British subject was anyone bora in Canada or who had been naturalized. Today we call them Canadian citizens.
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The Committee's recommendations should be assessed against what can almost be described as the tender, loving care with which Regulations 24 and 25 treated enemy aliens. While the Minister of Justice had the same right to intern them as he had to intern anyone else, the general rule laid down in Regulation 24 was:
All enemy aliens legally admitted to Canada and ordinarily resident in Canada, so long as they peacefully pursue their ordinary avocations, shall be allowed to continue to enjoy the protection of the law... and they shall not be arrested, detained or interfered with, provided they comply with the requirements in respect of registration.... However, if an enemy alien tried to leave Canada to assist the enemy or "engage in espionage or acts of a hostile nature," the RCMP was given specific power to arrest and detain such a person. If may come as a surprise to learn that by the same Regulation, any RCMP officer was also authorized specifically "to release any such person so arrested or detained .. of whose good faith and responsibility" the policeman was satisfied, so long as the person signed an undertaking to behave himself. One wonders why, if the police thought the person was of "good faith and responsibility," an arrest was necessary in the first place, unless it was for psychological reasons or to obtain the undertaking. Certainly no Communist could be let out of internment by an ordinary policeman. It took the justice minister to do that.
In line with the policy of treating enemy aliens well, the committee recommended that, at least for the time being, those of military age should not be interned. The policy made sense from the point of view of not stirring up communities of Germans and Italians and from the point of view of encouraging them to lose their national identity within the larger Canadian framework. As we shall see, the approach to Ukrainians was considerably different.
The committee was sensitive to apprehensions "on the part of those who fear abuse of the wide powers of Regulation 21." For this reason, some members doubted the wisdom of amending Regulation 21 so as to require the justice minister to report to Parliament on the numbers of persons interned and the numbers of cases in which he refused to follow the advice of an advisory committee, as, for example, by not releasing someone whose release had been recommended. Despite the doubts, this amendment was made law on 31 May. In contrast to the approach to enemy aliens, the committee adopted a very tough attitude towards civilian internees, both those already in custody and those about to be. This was done by recommending that all internees be defined for all custodial purposes as "prisoners of war." The recommendation was made although the committee expressly noted that civilian internees "are not necessarily prisoners of war within the meaning of the International Convention,... it might be desirable to remove any ambiguity" about their legal status. It therefore chose to ignore an important legal distinction and, in the supposed interests of removing ambiguity, recommended that anyone at all who was interned become automatically a "prisoner of war." The recommendation became law on 31 May. 24 It meant that there was now no legal distinction between three very different groups of imprisoned persons: first were the many thousands of prisoners of war and internees soon to flood into Canada from the United Kingdom.
25 Second were prisoners of war captured in combat-type situations by the Canadian armed forces and who had to be interned under treaty. Finally, there were the Canadian citizens who were political dissenters, including the Communists who would be labelled "prisoners of war" in their native land, along with "enemy aliens." It was a neat way of disguising the fact that these people were in fact political prisoners.
We now have two decisions which lack any stated reasons, either from the committee which made them and which was therefore the logical source of reasons, or from any other source. I have already speculated as to why Communist organizations were made illegal and internments began when they did. What was said then applies as well to the transformation of political prisoners into "prisoners of war." But behind and underneath these doings is the speculative factor already mentioned in the context of timing. It unquestionably existed in the minds of all 13 committee members: the fear and hatred of Communists which was endemic in the Canadian establishment and its government apparatus, including the politicians and the higher civil servants.
I have already noted Lapointe's reactionary views. King was no better if one is to judge from his opinion of Hitler. Hardly more than two years before Germany provoked World War II, King visited Hitler in a "strenuous effort to understand Nazi Germany" which at this very time was helping to throttle Spanish democracy. King had a long discussion with Hitler in which King made friendly overtures. (Canada and Germany had recently signed a trade pact.) King also attended an opera with Hermann Goering. On returning home, he reported that Hitler was just "a simple sort of peasant," not very intelligent and no serious danger to anyone. It is highly pertinent to ask how so supposedly-astute a political leader as King could have been so seriously deceived. Almost certainly, King himself was not deceived at all but engaged in a deliberate attempt to mislead Canadians, to put us off our guard and above all to lessen the credibility of the Left which, almost alone, was trying to warn of the grave danger that Hitler represented.
Given these realities of the Canadian political scene as the late 1930s merged into the early 1940s, any opportunity to clobber the Communists without too much turmoil would be welcome to the government Thus while in August 1939 Norman Robertson's arguments prevailed, nine months later the situation had changed sufficiently to justify the blows. As I shall explain, it curiously was the Communists themselves who helped to bring about this change by opposing the war, albeit in a very confused way. For King it was only a matter of timing the blows so as to maximize their negative effect on the Communists and so as to reinforce for years into the future a public suspicion of their activities.
These consequences could best be achieved when King acted, early in June. There was panic about the imminent fall of France and much talk of fifth columns. Italy was about to enter the war as Hitler's ally. Italian Fascist organizations had to be banned and some hundreds of their members interned. It was an excellent opportunity to smear the Communists for a long time to come by treating them in exactly the same way as the Fascists and Nazis were treated.
Translating the Committee's Report into Action
THE 'MECHANICS' whereby the Fascists and Communists were rendered illegal and interned can be quickly described. By 30 May 1940, Lapointe evidently had considered the committee's recommendations, for on that day he wrote to King summarizing the situation. He mentioned that the committee wanted all government departments to be instructed to cooperate with the RCMP and to make available any information relating to enemy aliens, including refugees, and that the RCMP should be authorized to establish a committee to act as a clearing house for intelligence about enemy aliens. The prime minister was asked to appoint a representative to act on the committee as a liaison officer with the police.
One 3 June, King wrote to Lapointe unctuously expressing his gratitude that steps were being taken to coordinate policies and exchange information among all branches of government to help combat enemy activity in Canada. He apparently drew no distinction between the activities of Communists in Canada, for example, and those of Nazis and Fascists. There is no clue in King's communication that any change in policy with regard to the Communists had taken place, although on the very day he wrote his letter the roundup of the Communists began. The following day, the party and a number of other organizations were illegalized. This was accomplished by adding Regulation 39c, which provided that "the following associations, societies, groups or organizations are hereby declared to be, and shall be deemed to be, illegal organizations, viz...." There follows a list of three German Many may be surprised to hear that it is not the Nazi nor the Fascist but the radical who constitutes our most troublesome problem. Whereas the enemy alien is usually recognizable and easily rendered innocuous by clear-cut laws applicable to his case, your "Red" has the protection of citizenship, his foreign master is not officially an enemy and, unless he blunders into the open and provides proof of his guilt, he is much more difficult to suppress. Since Communism was outlawed, most of his work is carried on under cover of other organizations and associations pretending to be, or in reality, loyal to the Constitution. It is important to remember this for the reason that this type of fifth column activity is least understood by our Canadian people, and yet is doing most harm at the present time. Buck then met his executive, which could not make up its collective mind about the same two vital issues: the nature of the war and Canada's real status. In the course of their agonizings, five decisions were made, some mutually contradictory. In sequence, over the space of a few days, the political bureau agreed:
( 1 ) to support neutrality, (2) to declare that neutrality and "joining with the U.S. was adventurism," (3) to "insist on all-out war for the defeat of Hitler," (4) to publish a "mish mash" of policies in the party press. "Now," says Buck, "we really had confusion in the Party." It is clear that a principal source of the confusion was Buck himself. He had not really agreed with the majority who pressed for the "all-out war" proposition but voted for it, as he says, "under pressure [and] was being conquered at the time was not specified. In fact, it was Poland, and neither Britain nor France were the conquerors in question.
Position No. S was argued about for several weeks and was adopted and finally published as a pamphlet in October, the Political Letter On Our Present Tasks. Possession of it formed the basis for a number of prosecutions, rather than internments, under the Defence Regulations, which forbade opposition to the war and possessing documents expressing such opposition.
Notwithstanding the declaration of this position, the disputations went on; Buck himself went to live (underground) in New York for a year to avoid internment and, as he says, became "thoroughly impregnated with the Rooseveltian neutrality." In his absence, those Political Bureau members still not interned developed the bizarre theory that "Canada was in helpless colonial bondage to Britain" and carried this to the point of making "a thinly disguised suggestion that if Hitler was victorious, Canada would gain her independence."
From New York, Buck tried to reverse that trend. At one point he met with the Political Bureau people in New York (they had no difficulty crossing the border), where agreement was reached to "initiate wage movements" but it was soon forgotten. As Buck candidly admits: "just as the comrades in Toronto were isolated from the thinking of Canadian workers, so was I."
It is clear that once the "all-out war" approach was rejected (Buck does not say why) in favour of "neutrality," there was only a short step to seeing a Hitler victory as acceptable, particularly if it freed Canada from British colonial bondage. How, one wonders, in seeing Canada as a British Colony (it had not been so since about 1921) did these dialecticians not realize they were kicking at an open door, while the actual process of colonization by the US had already proceeded a considerable distance under Mackenzie King?
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There is no doubt that once the decision to oppose Canadian participation in the war was made public, illegalizations and internments were assured. I have already pointed out the skilful timing.
The The weight of internment fell most heavily upon the Ukrainians. Of the 78 internees, 52 were born or naturalized Canadians (eight from Québec), 13 were "other British subjects," and the remaining 13 "other nationalities." In short, two-thirds of the internees were Canadians, while the remaining one-third was divided equally between the other two groups. Among the 78, however, no fewer than 25 were men of Ukrainian origin. That represented 32 per cent of the total. Moreover, most of these men came from Manitoba. There may be more significance in this emphasis on Ukrainians than at first appears. One must not forget that at the time, the Ukrainians in Canada represented the third-largest ethnic group in the country, following immediately after the two so-called "founding races."
Wood's reference to the valuable Ukrainian property in Winnipeg may also provide a clue as to what was really going on, as, I believe, does correspondence between E.C. Coleman, the Undersecretary of State, and O.D. Skelton of External Affairs during October and November 1940." Coleman says that he had discussed the subject matter of his correspondence with the police and other (unspecified) authorities and wondered about the possibility of using certain printing plants belonging to foreign language newspapers (the largest circulation of these was among the Ukrainians) in order to conduct patriotic campaigns among these people. He believed from his own experience that "many who subscribed to newspapers which had a subversive tinge did so not because of the political policies advocated by those newspapers but because they were almost the only newspapers published in their native language." He suggested Professor Watson Kirkconnell of McMaster University as a possible leader for such a program.
Skelton replied in such a way as to indicate no great degree of interest in the proposal. He wondered, however, whether some effort might not be made to use the properties in different cities for community social life, which at one time had been a focal point for the various ethnic communities.
Coleman replied that he had not lost sight of the properties but that it was a hard job to collect and tabulate accurate information about them. He mentions that the armed forces were now using the Labour Temple in North Winnipeg and that the University of Alberta was being encouraged to use the Ukrainian Temple in Edmonton. He also mentions that Canadian clubs have been asked to consider ways in which constructive programs among the so-called "new Canadians" might be processed through the various halls which had been built by the left-wing organizations.
Another clue to the heavy emphasis on the Ukrainians is provided by T.C. Davis, Associate Deputy Minister of National War Services, in the same correspondence. He wrote to Norman Robertson putting forward proposals for the "Canadianization" of Ukrainians and other ethnic groups by means of a propaganda campaign which he thought would "direct these people along proper lines in the interest of Canada." Perhaps he had in mind a US-style "melting pot" in which the Ukrainians would lose their rich, left-wing cultural heritage which their halls and their press helped to maintain. The Ukrainians were particularly solid and reliable supporters of the Old Communist Party and even if melting-pot theory was not involved, the RCMP certainly would have been anxious to use internment as a means of intimidating the Ukrainians and discouraging them from supporting the party in future. In that way the party would lose one of its principal mass-bases in Canada, and a reliable source of funds. It is interesting to speculate why, after more than a year of interning people, some government official would suddenly decide that all prior internments were illegal and that a special Order-in-Council therefore had to be passed in order to cure the defect.
The internments were indeed illegal because they had not been in the form of orders but mere recommendations. Section 21 is quite clear that any internment had to be by This is significant because it shows that the RCMP Special Section was quite prepared to go along with the "Archduke's" request. However, the file also contains two memoranda from External Affairs officials which quashed Rive's proposal. One of them pointed out that the so-called Archduke was merely a private citizen living in the United States. "It seems curious that a request about Austrian subjects" should come by way of a consulate in charge of German interests. The comment is also made that the reference to Austrian "subjects" should really be to "citizens," because Austria was a republic and no longer a monarchy. The man in External Affairs comments further, "I do not see any reason at all why we should help supply Charles Hapsburg with information of this character...."
Another External Affairs official recorded that he was opposed to giving Charles any information, but that he did not know what the policy of the Special Section might be. However, he thought it most unlikely that a request for a list of Austrian citizens should be forwarded "on behalf of an Austrian person of no status whatever." He therefore concluded that the so-called Archduke should not be given the information. Presumably, this advice was followed despite the fact that the Special Section was quite willing to do what a feudal remnant of the Hapsburg monarchy wanted. It is another illustration, if one is needed, of the extreme right-wing attitude of the RCMP.
What about Due Process of Law?
WHATWASTHERELATIONSHIP, if any, between the Defence of Canada Regulations, with all the vast powers they conferred on the Minister of Justice and the RCMP, and "due process of law?" Was it not a patent violation of due process to allow the imprisonment of political dissenters without the normal safeguards, including a trial by a court of law? At first blush, the answer seems obviously yes, but in reality there can always be due process so long as mistakes such as the one mentioned earlier, when internments were "recommended" instead of being "ordered," are avoided. This brings us to the fact that any State will always reserve unto itself the ultimate power to act in ways contrary to its own norms of behaviour and its own customs in a situation which it conceives to be an emergency. The usual way is to make sure that there is a loophole which permits shortcuts to be made even though the letter of the constitution or the law is observed. Thus in England there is a loophole permitting this even in Magna Carta itself. I have already quoted its prohibition of any punishments "save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." It is the last six words which constitute the loophole: for if Parliament can be induced to pass a law authorizing, say, torture, then torture becomes "the law of the land" and is perfectly legal. The same kind of loophole is found in the War Measures Act, which authorizes the government to control "all arrests and detentions." Once the government has invoked that power, as it may lawfully do when it considers or fears that a state of war or insurrection exists, it is legally free to do whatever it wants in the field of arrests and detentions so long as it follows its own regulations. Even then an error makes no practical difference because the victim cannot obtain redress in the courts, the remedy of habeas corpus having been eliminated, perfectly legally. The fact that similar loopholes existed in a fundamental law promulgated in feudal England and an Act of Parliament passed in 1914 in Canada, a capitalist country, suggests that both types of class society will possess similar potentially oppressive characteristics. The people in whose interest society is organized and operated will always, in one way or another, protect their class interests by reserving to their government ways and means of coping with emergencies. Such a situation, I believe, will disappear only in a genuinely classless society, one in which no small group effectively controls the State in the interests of that group. When this situation comes about there will be no State, for by definition a State is precisely the apparatus by which one group in society exercises control over all others and which is therefore, inherently and of necessity, a coercive apparatus.
The problem of transforming the State from being such an apparatus into its opposite is central to most left-wing politics and has been so since the days of the Communist Manifesto of 1848, if not earlier. It would seem that no effective solution to this problem has yet been discovered. I told MacNeill that I was appalled by the programme contemplated, and that it involved a great deal of bitter interracial resentment and the prospect of endless labour troubles throughout industrial and mining areas, as well as the alienation of the sympathy and support of great blocks of opinion which, if properly handled, could be led to support any efforts the Government was making rather than to oppose them. I thought the Police should concentrate on their plans for the immediate arrest of persons suspected of treasonable activity, and that they would be ill advised to destroy organizations about which they now know a good deal and with whose personnel they are familiar. It would drive them underground, which would greatly increase the Police problems in this country in war time. I thought, further, that as regards the whole question of the status of the Communists, we should not take any precipitate action, but should wait and see how they adapt themselves to new international alignments; that the wind had been taken out of their sails by the events of recent days, and they had been badly compromised by developments in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., and that I would be surprised if the Police found them abetting Nazi or Fascist activities in this country or very actively prosecuting their own propagandistic activities.
MacNeill said he fully shared my views. He felt his Minister's position in dealing with Police recommendations of this sort was very difficult, it would be strengthened if the responsibility for approving or disapproving Police recommendations were shared with this Department, and he inquired whether we would be willing to be associated directly with the Department of Justice in deciding questions of policy in respect of the handling of subversive activities in war time. I said that in the circumstances I thought that you felt about these matters much the way I did, and that you would probably approve of our continuing in war time the contacts with the Police in this sphere that we had built up in recent years, and in that case I would probably continue to be our Department's representative in interdepartmental discussions. He is going into the question with Mr. Lapointe this afternoon, and we will probably hear from him shortly. is an internationally recognized, bilingual association committed to encouraging historical research and public interest in history, promoting the preservation of historic sites and buildings, and publishing historical works and documents. It lobbies archives, museums, governments, and granting agencies in the interest of historians, particularly on issues relating to the preservation of heritage materials and public access to historical documents. Many members are professional historians, but the CHA also encourages anyone with an interest in history to join.
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